Missouri Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 4 Fall 2005

Article 16

Fall 2005

Current State of Co-Employee Immunity under Workers'
Compensation Law, The
Michael S. Kruse

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael S. Kruse, Current State of Co-Employee Immunity under Workers' Compensation Law, The, 70 MO.
L. REV. (2005)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/16

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.
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Comment
The Current State of Co-Employee

Immunity Under Workers' Compensation
Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The exclusivity provision of Missouri's Workers' Compensation Act
("the Act")' essentially constitutes a statutory mandated quid-pro-quo agreement amongst employees and their employers. Under the terms of the Act,
employers incur the burden of no-fault liability for workplace injuries.2 The
Act states that "[e]very employer ... shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation . . . for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of [his] employment." 3 In
exchange for employers incurring this burden, the Act statutorily abrogates
any common law right of action the employee may hold against the employer
for the injury.4 In this regard, the Act states that "[e]very employer subject to
the provisions of this chapter ... shall be released from all5 other liability...
whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person."
The exclusivity provision of the Act, however, does nothing to prevent
injured employees from bringing suit against negligent third parties for their
workplace injuries. 6 The Act recognizes the potential for such situations by
since
providing employers with a right of subrogation against any recovery
7
they remain liable for the workplace injury under the no-fault scheme.
If the Act provides an injured employee with less in benefits than the
employee would have likely recovered as damages under a common law negligence suit, the ability to sue a negligent third party is an attractive option.
Many times, workplace injuries occur because of the negligence of an injured
party's co-employee. Therefore, to gain the benefits of the third-party suit
option, injured parties may argue that their negligent co-employee is a "third
person" not entitled to the exclusivity provision of the Act.

1. The Workers' Compensation Law, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 287.010-287.811
(2000).
2. Id. § 287.120.1.
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. Id. § 287.120.2.
5. Id. § 287.120.1.
6. Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Props., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo.
1991) (en banc).
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.150 (2000).
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Missouri courts have dealt with the issue of whether negligent coemployees constitute "third persons" many times, but they have struggled to
formulate a workable rule. In principle, Missouri courts have accepted the
premise that a co-employee can potentially constitute a "third person" subject
to a common law suit for acts of workplace negligence.8 In application, the
courts only allow injured employees to bring such suits when they allege that9
the co-employee committed "something more" than a mere negligent act.
This Comment will attempt to identify what constitutes "something more."

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Generally, under Missouri law, employees have enjoyed the same immunity from common law suit as their employers when an employee's negligence has caused another to suffer a workplace injury.'0 The basis for such
immunity is the employer's non-delegable duty to provide its employees with
a reasonably safe working environment." Since this duty is non-delegable,
negligent acts of an employee causing a breach of the duty are imputed
to the
employer.' 2 Accordingly, the exclusivity provisions of the Act apply.13
If, however, an employee's negligence constitutes "something more"
than a mere breach of the employer's non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe work place, the employee will not enjoy the immunity provi-

sions of the Act.' 4 This is known as the "something more" doctrine. Rather
than formulate an exact rule stating what constitutes "something more," Mis-5
souri courts have chosen to make the determination on a case-by-case basis.'

A. The Beginning of the Doctrine
While the State of Missouri first enacted the Act in 1926,16 a Missouri
appellate court did not expressly deal with the question of co-employee immunity until the 1982 case, State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner.'7 The plaintiff
in Badami suffered a workplace injury when his hand was drawn into a shred8. State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)

(en banc) ("It is accepted in this state that a co-employee, or fellow servant or foreman is a 'third person' . . . and that he may be sued by an injured co-employee for his
negligence resulting in the compensable injury.").
9. State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 621-22 (Mo. 2002) (en
banc).
10. Id. at 621.
11. Badami, 630 S.W.2d at 180.
12. See id. at 179-80.
13. See id.
14. Taylor, 73 S.W.3d at 622.
15. Id.
16. Mo. REV.STAT. § 287.010 (2000).
17. 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/16
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ding machine.' 8 After receiving workers' compensation benefits from his
employer, the plaintiff brought suit against the president and production manager of the company.' 9 The plaintiff argued that the employer delegated its
duty to provide a safe work environment to these two co-employees, and, by
failing to equip the shredding machine with safety devices, they breached the
duty delegated to them. 20 The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that they
enjoyed immunity under workers' compensation law.2' The court framed the
issue before it as:
whether a supervisory employee, including a corporate officer,
may be held personally liable for injuries sustained by a fellow
employee covered by workermen's compensation where the injuries occur because of the supervisor's failure to perform the duty,
assigned to him by the employer, to provide the fellow employee a
reasonably safe place to work.22
The court identified the question as one of first impression in Missouri.23
To determine how the Missouri legislature intended this issue be handled, the Badami court began by examining what the state of the law was
when Missouri first passed the Act. 24 At common law, parties injured at work
could not recover from their employer if the injury was caused by the negligence of a co-employee. 25 Rather, the injured party's sole remedy was against
the co-employee whose negligence caused the injury. 26 In an effort to lessen
the harsh effect of this rule, 27 Missouri courts formulated a rule that an employer's duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace was non-delegable. 28
Under such a rule, a party injured as a result of a co-employee's negligence in
duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace was
carrying out the employer's
29
to sue the employer.
The Badami court continued by stating that employees were agents of
their employers for the purpose of carrying out this non-delegable duty.30 Under the law of agency as it existed in 1926, agents were only liable to parties
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
(1925)).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. (citing Bender v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 276 S.W. 405, 406
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177 (citing Bender, 276 S.W. at 406).
See generally id.
Id.
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other than their principal for acts of misfeasance in carrying out their duties,
i.e., an affirmative act.3 1 They were not liable to third parties for mere acts of
nonfeasance in carrying out their duties because, in such a circumstance, they
32
only owed a duty to their principal. Thus, employees could only be personally
33
liable to each other for workplace injuries caused by their acts of misfeasance.
While the court acknowledged that the law of agency regarding agent liability to third parties for passive negligence had changed since 1926, the
court stated that the change occurred independent of the State's compensation
legislation.34 Given the state of the law at the time the State passed the Act,
the court in Badami held that the Missouri legislature must have intended that
the immunity provisions of the Act apply to co-employees when they merely
failed in their assigned duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace since this
was a non-delegable duty owed by the employer, not the employee.35 The
court held that suit could be brought against a co-employee only if the plaintiff alleged "something more" than a mere failure to carry out this nondelegable duty.3 6 Keeping with the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,
"something more" would be affirmative acts that caused or increased the risk
of injury. 37 The court concluded by stating that whether this "something
38
more" was present would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Since Badami, the issue of co-employee immunity has reached the Supreme Court of Missouri three times. 39 Each time, the "something more" doctrine dictated the Court's decision.40 The application of the doctrine, however,
differed slightly with each case.41
B. Subsequent Evolution
In Tauchert v. Boatman's National Bank of St. Louis, the plaintiff was
injured when an elevator cab on which he was standing "fell five or six floors
to the bottom of [the] elevator shaf. '' 2 The plaintiff recovered workers'
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 179.
36. Id. at 180.
37. See id. at 177-80.
38. Id. at 180-81.
39. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. 2002) (en banc);
Tauchert v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 849 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)
(per curiam); Kelley v. DeKalb Energy Co., 865 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
40. See Taylor, 73 S.W.3d 620; Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d 573; Kelley, 865 S.W.2d
670.
41. See Taylor, 73 S.W.3d 620; Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d 573; Kelley, 865 S.W.2d
670.
42. Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d at 573.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/16
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compensation benefits from his employer and later filed suit against the job's
foreman for negligence in rigging the faulty elevator system.43 The foreman
argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of the
4
Act, and the trial court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion.
In a short opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
foreman was not immune from suit because he had engaged in active negligence outside of the employer's duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace.4 5 The court stated that "[tjhe creation of a hazardous [work] condition
is not merely a breach of an employer's duty to provide a safe place to
work.'4 The court continued by stating that if an injured party's co-employee
engages in such actions, the co-employee will not be immune from suit by
reason of the Act. 4 7 The court found that allegations that the foreman personally arranged the faulty elevator system were sufficient to preclude summary
48
judgment on workers' compensation exclusivity grounds.
Similarly, in the second Supreme Court of Missouri case on the issue,
Kelley v. DeKalb Energy Co., 49 the plaintiffs claim against his co-employees
was the result of their design and manufacturing of a workplace item that
caused an injury. 50 Injured when a com flamer exploded, the plaintiff settled
his workers' compensation claim and then brought suit against five of his
fellow employees. 5 1 In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged "negligent design,
manufacture and construction of the corn flamer. '' 52 The court recognized that
"an employee may sue a fellow employee for affirmative negligent acts out3
side the scope of an employer's responsibility to provide a safe workplace.""
However, the court held that the suit was barred under the facts of the case
because the design and construction of the com flamer "was part of the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace." 54 The court distinguished Tauchert on the grounds that the elevator at issue in that case was
"make-shift" or "jerry-rigged" by the foreman. 55 The corn flamer at issue in
Kelley, on the other6hand, was simply designed and manufactured according
to company policy.5

43. Id. at 573-74.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 574.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 865 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
50. See id.; Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d 573.
51. Kelley, 865 S.W.2d at 670.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 672.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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In State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace,57 the court's most recent determination
under the "something more" doctrine, the plaintiff was injured while riding in a
trash truck driven by one of his fellow employees.5 8 The plaintiff fell from the
truck and suffered injuries as a result of the driver striking the mailbox.5 9 The
plaintiff received workers' compensation for his injuries and later brought suit
against his co-employee, averring that his injuries resulted from the coemployee's "negligent and careless driving." 60 The court recognized an injured
employee's ability to bring suits against a co-employee for affirmative negligent acts beyond the duty to maintain a safe working environment. 61 However,
the court held that "an allegation that an employee failed to drive safely in the
of 'somecourse of his work and injured a fellow worker is not an allegation
62
thing more' than a failure to provide a safe working environment."
C. Recent Missouri Courtof Appeals Opinions
Since Taylor, the issue of co-employee immunity has reached the Missouri Court of Appeals six times. 63 However, in only one case, Groh v. Kohler,64 did the court find "something more" to exist.
The first of these appellate cases, Brown v. Roberson,65 involved a similar fact pattern as Taylor. The plaintiff was injured when the tractor-trailer
truck in which he was riding overturned. 66 Suing the co-employee who was
driving the truck, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was:
(1) operating his vehicle at a speed that was excessive under the
existing circumstances; (2) taking a route that was inappropriate
for the tractor-trailer; (3) failing to ensure the load was secure and
would not shift; and (4) operating his vehicle when he knew the
6
7
load had shifted thereby creating a substantial risk of overtuming.

57. 73 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
58. Id. at 621.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 621-22.
62. Id. at 622.
63. Graham v. Geisz, 149 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Groh v. Kohler, 148
S.W.3d I1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Logan v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 122 S.W.3d
670 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Kesterson v. Wallut, 116 S.W.3d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003);
Quinn v. Clayton Constr. Co., Ill S.W.3d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Brown v.
Roberson, 111 S.W.3d 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
64. 148 S.W.3d 11.
65. 111 S.W.3d 422.
66. Id. at 423.
67. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/16
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The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that
workers' compensation law had exclusive jurisdiction over the
Missouri
68
claim.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the co-employee defendant should
not enjoy the immunity provided by the Act. 69 Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant "was liable for plaintiffs injuries and not cloaked
with immunity because his actions causing plaintiffs injuries were an act of
misfeasance and a breach of an independent duty to plaintiff, and therefore
actionable as70 something more than a breach of the duty to maintain a safe
workplace.,
Finding Taylor controlling, the appellate court held that the co-employee
defendant was immune from liability under the exclusivity provisions of the
Act. 7' The court characterized the claims before it as (1) a defendant failing to
"discharge his duty to operate [a] vehicle safely," and (2) a defendant failing
to "ensure [that a] load was secure and would not shift., 72 Under Taylor, the
court said that a failure to drive safely in the course of one's work does not
constitute "something more." 73 Therefore, the plaintiff's allegations were
merely claims that a co-employee breached the employer's duty to provide a
reasonably safe work place, and the immunity provisions of the Act applied.74
The next case before the court of appeals, Quinn v. Clayton Construction Co., 75 involved a plaintiff injured when a co-employee threw a piece of
steel from a roof at a construction job site. Performing "general cleanup" at
the project, one co-employee on the ground told another on the roof to "just
throw [the piece of steel] down" while he stood guard.76 The co-employee on
the ground did not see the plaintiff walk through a nearby access door until it
was too late, and the plaintiff was struck by the piece of falling steel.7 7
The evidence showed that the co-employees disregarded their employer's promulgated rules. 78 The plaintiff sued the co-employees in their
individual capacities, alleging negligence in that they:
(1) disregarded their employer's safety rules and engaged in an independent and affirmative act of negligence that created an unreasonable risk of harm to their fellow worker, James Quinn; (2) were
68. Id.
69. Id. at 424.
70, ld. at 424 (quotation omitted).
71. Id. at 425.
72. Id. at 424-25.
73. Id. at 424 (quoting State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 622 (Mo.
2002) (en banc)).
74. Id. at 424-25.
75. 111 S.W.3d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 431.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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and (3) breached a
present at the time of James Quinn's injury;
79
personal duty of care toward James Quinn.
The trial court held the plaintiffs claim barred by the exclusivity provision of
the Act."0
On appeal, the court upheld the trial court's determination.8 ' Once
again, the court of appeals found Taylor controlling.82 The court characterized
the plaintiffs claim as "nothing more than an allegation that [defendants]
failed to discharge their duty to safely throw iron or steel from a roof."8 3 Ac'4
cording to the court, this was "not an allegation of 'something more."'
compensation law had exclusive jurisdiction over the
Therefore, workers'
85
plaintiffs claim.
In Kesterson v. Wallut,8 6 the plaintiff was injured when, as a passenger in
a pickup truck driven by a co-employee, the truck crossed the median of the
interstate and struck an oncoming vehicle.8 7 As a result of being ejected from
the vehicle, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries, for which she received workers' compensation benefits. 88 Subsequently, she brought a claim against the coemployee driver alleging that his negligence "caused the... accident by failing
to keep a careful lookout, driving at a speed that was excessive for the circumstances, and failing to drive within his lane of travel.",89 The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on workers' compensation exclusivity grounds which the
trial court initially overruled. 9° However, before the case went to trial, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided Taylor.9 1 Citing Taylor,92the defendant filed an
amended motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted.
93
On appeal, the plaintiff attempted to distinguish Taylor from her case.
She argued that Taylor was intended "to be limited to situations where the vehicle in question is essentially the workplace, as opposed to simply being a
mode of transportation to and from work sites.",94 The court of appeals dis-

79. Id. at 432.
80. Id. at 431.
81. Id. at 430.
82. See id. at 432-33.
83. Id. at 433.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 433-34.

86. 116 S.W.3d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
87. Id. at 592.
88. Id. at 592-93.

89. Id. at 593.
90. Id.

91. Id. at 594.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 596.
94. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/16
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agreed, stating that the case fell "squarely within the purview of Taylor."95
Interpreting Taylor, the court stated that the Missouri Supreme Court was not
concerned with whether the vehicle essentially constituted the workplace or
was merely a mode of transportation.96 Rather, the supreme court "simply held
without any apparent qualification that 'an allegation that an employee failed to
drive safely in the course of his work and injured a fellow worker is not an
allegation of 'something more' than a failure to provide a safe working envi98
ronment. ,,9 7 Thus, the court of appeals upheld the decision of the trial court.
In Logan v. Sho-Me Power Electric Coop.,99 the court of appeals once
again held that the plaintiffs claim against a co-employee was barred by the
exclusivity provision of the Act. In Logan, a wrongful death suit was brought
by an injured employee's parents as the result of the fatal electrocution the
employee suffered while installing fiber-optic cable lines.1 °0 The parents attempted to sue their son's supervisor in his individual capacity under the
"something more" doctrine.' 0 l In particular, the parents alleged that (1) the
supervisor ordered their son to work around an energized power line when he
knew their son was only an apprentice; (2) the supervisor created a "hazardous condition" by authorizing the line to be energized; and (3) "by directing
[their son] to work on the line, [the supervisor] was directing [their son] to
engage in a dangerous condition that a reasonable person would recognize as
hazardous beyond the usual requirements of employment."' 10 2 The trial 0court
3
dismissed this complaint because of the exclusivity provision of the Act.'
On appeal, the trial court's decision was upheld. The court of appeals
found the requirements of the injured employee's job mandated work on energized power lines on certain occasions."0 4 Therefore, the defendant did not
create a hazardous condition beyond the usual requirements of employment.105 Additionally the court found that, while the co-employee may have
been negligent in failing to supervise the apprentice lineman, this amounted
to nothing more than the co-employee's failure to carry out his employer's
court of appeals
non-delegable duty to provide a safe work place.l 0 6 Thus, 10the
7
held the claim against the co-employee barred by the Act.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 73 S.W.3d 620, 622 (Mo. 2002)
(en banc)).
98. Id.
99. 122 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
100. Id. at 672-73.
101. Id. at 677.
102. Id. at 678 (quotation omitted).
103. Id. at 677.
104. Id. at 678.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 678-79.
107. Id. at 679.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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08
is the only one of the six appellate cases since Taylor
Groh v. Kohler,1
in which the court of appeals found "something more" to exist. In Groh an
employee was injured when a defective machine with which she was ordered to
work malfunctioned. 10 9 The plaintiff's job required her to operate a band molding machine that compressed and "punch[ed] inserted plastic into the desired
shape." 10 Over time, the machine would accumulate plastic which the plaintiff
was to remove by hand. 1'1When in perfect working order, the machine was not
supposed to compress unless the operator depressed the foot pedal. 12 The
plaintiff's machine, however, occasionally compressed without the plaintiff
depressing the pedal, thus posing a risk to the plaintiff when she had to reach
into the machine to remove accumulated plastic." 3 The plaintiff had previously
informed her supervisor of the defect, but the supervisor told her to "quit whining" and "just deal with it."' 114 Subsequent to this conversation, the plaintiff's
hand was injured in the machine in the course of doing her job. 15 After her suit
against her supervisor was dismissed, the plaintiff appealed alleging that:

[Her supervisor] knew of the defective nature of the ...machine

and purposefully and affirmatively ordered [her] to continue to
work on the machine, and these allegations are sufficient to assert a
cause of action over which the courts have subject matter jurisdicCompensation
tion that is not preempted by Missouri's Workers'
16
Law and for which a remedy can be granted."
The court of appeals held that "something more" was present as a result
of the supervisor ordering the employee to work with a machine she knew to
be defective.' 17 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Missouri Supreme Court's statement in Tauchert v. Boatman's National Bank of St. Louis

that

"

[t]he creation of a hazardous condition is not merely a breach of an

employer's duty to provide a safe place to work ....

Such acts constitute a

breach of [a] personal duty of care owed to plaintiff.""' 8 The court found the
creation of a hazardous condition because the plaintiff "was effectively re-

108. 148 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
109. Id. at 12.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 12-13.
117. Id. at 16.
118. Id. (quoting Tauchbert v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 849 S.W.2d
573, 574 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/16

10

Kruse: Kruse: Current State of Co-Employee Immunity under Workers' Compensation Law
CO-EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY
1325
2005]

quired by her supervisor and co-employee to perform an inherently dangerous
act although the duties [of] her job were not inordinately dangerous." 119
The most recent court of appeals case dealing with this issue is Graham
v. Geisz.120 The plaintiff, an employee with Fed-Ex, was injured while he and
cargo stored in large containers known as
a co-employee were unloading
"cans" from airplanes. 12 1 These cans, which moved on rollers onto and off of
the plane, could be locked into place. 122 The plaintiff instructed his coemployee to keep each can locked until he told her to unlock it.1 23 When the
co-employee defendant unlocked a can she was not supposed to, it rolled
down and collided with the plaintiff.124 The plaintiff brought suit against the
co-employee as a result of his injuries alleging:
[the] defendant acted negligently when she a) unlocked the can behind plaintiff when she knew or should have known it was unsafe
to do so, b) failed to determine [whether] it was safe to unlock the
can prior to doing so, or c) unlocked the can when she knew or
should have known that the can would move and
125 create an increased risk of injury to others working in the area.
Further, the "plaintiff alleged that [the] defendant took these actions
126
willfully, wantonly and with a conscious disregard for the safety of others."'
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on exclusivity
grounds. 127 The plaintiffs sole point on appeal was that defendant's "conduct
was actionable
as something more than a breach of the duty to maintain a safe
128
workplace."'

Determining that Taylor controlled, the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's decision.' 29 It reasoned that the defendant was simply "engaged in her
routine [duties] of unlocking cans so they could move on [the] rollers."'' 30 The
defendant's "failure to wait for clearance or determine that it was safe to proceed before releasing a lock on one of the cans is not the purposeful, affirmatively dangerous creation of a hazardous condition ...necessary to remove
the conduct from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
149 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id. (quotation omitted).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 462.
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Law.' 131 Thus, the plaintiff's claim amounted to no more than an allegation
that the defendant failed 32to discharge her employer's duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace.'
Findingthe
D. Pre-TaylorMissouri Court of Appeals Decisions
33
Existence of "SomethingMore ,1
Since Taylor, the court of appeals has found "something more" to exist in
a claim against a co-employee only once.' 34 One must look to earlier court of
appeals' decisions to see other situations in which "something more" existed.
Craft v. Scamen,' 35 involved a worker at a fireworks factory who was injured when the machine with which he was working caught on fire.' 36 The fire
was the result of a co-employee "jerry rigging" the machine and then ordering
the plaintiff to operate the machine faster than the employee had been doing
previously.' 37 This conduct constituted "something more" in the view of the
court.1 38 The court reasoned that the co-employee had directed the plaintiff to
recparticipate in acts that were dangerous and that a reasonable person would
139
ognize as hazardous and beyond the usual requirements of employment.
In Hedglin v. Stahl Specialty Co.,14 a supervisor required the plaintiff to
climb to the top of a vat containing scalding water, enter the vat, and hang
from a forklift operated by the supervisor to remove a submerged gate.' 4' The
plaintiff was fatally injured when he fell from the forklift into the scalding
water.' 42 When suit was brought against the supervisor as a co-employee, the
court held that "something more" was present.143 The particular averments
the court found sufficient were as follows:
Defendant Corkran deliberately, intentionally, and in conscious
disregard for the safety of [Hedglin], subjected [Hedglin] to the extreme and unreasonable risk of injury and death.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 462-63.
133. This section does not list all of the pre- Taylor opinions finding the existence

of "something more." Rather, it is just a sample.
134. See supra Part I.C.
135. 715 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).

136. Id. at 532-33.
137. Id. at 533.
138. Id. at 537.
139. See id. at 537-38.
140. 903 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).

141. Id. at 927.
142. Id. at 924.
143. Id. at 926.
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On July 1, 1992, Defendant Corkran ordered and directed [Hedglin] to undertake responsibilities which created a separate and extreme risk of injury and death, far beyond that anticipated or contemplated by the ordinary duties and responsibilities of [Hedglin's]
position of employment. [Hedglin] was directed to remove a screen
or grate from the agitator which was submerged in the cooling vat
filled with scalding water. The vat was not drained. Using a forklift
with a cable or chain, (Hedglin] was ordered or directed to climb to
the top of the vat, which was unguarded and unprotected for human use, and hang from the forks of144a forklift in order to lift the
grate out of the vat of scalding water.
The court found that the defendant's conduct constituted the type145of affirmative negligent act required to overcome the exclusivity of the Act.
Another pre-Taylor case in which the court found "something more,"
Pavia v. Childs,146 also involved an injury caused by a forklift. The supervisor had instructed the plaintiff to stand upon a wooden pallet which a forklift
raised 15 feet off the ground so the plaintiff could remove certain items in the
store's warehouse. 147 When the plaintiff brought suit against the supervisor as
a co-employee, the appellate court found "something more" existed.' 48 Relying on the proposition that "the creation of a hazardous condition is not
merely a breach of an employer's duty to provide a safe place to work,"'149 the
court found that "[a]rranging a faulty hoist system for an elevator may constiact outside the scope of the responsibility to
tute an affirmative negligent
IS
provide a safe workplace."' O
Finally, in Workman v. Vader, the court of appeals found "something
more" existed when the plaintiff, a jewelry worker, slipped on a piece of cardboard that her co-employee had left on the floor.151 The defendant co-employee
had thrown this debris on the floor and failed to remove it.'5 2 The court held
that leaving the cardboard on the floor constituted "something more" because
the co-employee's actions created a hazardous condition.15 3 In essence, the cocare in hanemployee breached her common law duty "to exercise reasonable
' 54
dling or disposing of the packing materials and cardboard box."'
144. Id. at 927 (alterations in original).
145. Id.
146. 951 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
147. Id. at 701.
148. Id. at 702.
149. Id. at 701 (quoting Tauchert v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 849
S.W.2d 573, 574 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
150. Id. (citing Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d at 574).
151. 854 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
152. Id. at 561.
153. Id. at 564.
154. Id.
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III. WHERE THE "SOMETHING MORE" DOCTRINE STANDS TODAY

Following State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace,155 it appears that the Missouri
Supreme Court now requires something even more than was required in State
56
ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner.1
In Badami, the court spoke in terms of non-

feasance and misfeasance.' 57 The Badami opinion suggests that as long as
misfeasance was present, a claim for "something more" could
be sustained. 58
159
accurate.
from
After Taylor, however, that conclusion is far
In the first case before it, Tauchert v. Boatman's National Bank of St.
Louis, the Missouri Supreme Court appeared to endorse the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.16 The determinate fact in that case was that
the defendant did not simply fail to take steps to ensure the safety of the
work environment. 16 1 Rather, the co-employee committed an affirmative
the work environment unsafe, i.e., "jerry rigging" an eleaction that made
62

vator shaft. 1
In Kelley v. DeKalb Energy Co., the Missouri Supreme Court appeared
to retreat from this position slightly by holding that the misfeasance must not
simply be the result of a co-employee following a company policy.' 63 In that
case, an affirmative action by the defendant led to the plaintiffs injury, i.e.,
their negligent design and manufacture of the corn flamers at issue. 6 4 However, the Court found the employees immune
from suit because their actions
1 65
were in accordance with company policy.
In Taylor, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction became even more
blurred.166 The co-employee in Taylor committed an act of misfeasance, neg-

155. 73 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. 2002) (en banc); see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Taylor.
156. 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see supra notes 17-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Badami.
157. Id. at 177.
158. See id. at 179.
159. See Taylor, 73 S.W.3d 620; Graham v. Geisz, 149 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004); Logan v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 122 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003);
Kesterson v. Wallut, 116 S.W.3d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Quinn v. Clayton Constr.
Co., 111 S.W.3d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Brown v. Roberson, 11 S.W.3d 422 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2003).
160. See 849 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam); supra notes 4248 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tauchert.
161. Id. at 574.
162. Id.
163. 865 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kelley.
164. Id. at 671-72.
165. Id. at 672.
166. State ex rel. Taylor v. Wallace, 865 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
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ligent driving, that was not simply the result of a faulty company policy.
Court found the negligent co-employee enjoyed immunity
Nevertheless, the
8
under the Act.16
Taylor could be read as effectively eliminating any relevant distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance in the co-employee immunity context.
Prior to Taylor, the court of appeals found "something more" on several occasions when the co-employee committed an affirmative negligent act. In
Craft, the court found "something more" as a result of a co-employee "jerry
rigging" a fireworks machine and ordering the plaintiff to thereafter operate it
in an unsafe manner. 169 In Hedglin, the court found "something more" when
70
the co-employee operated a forklift in a manner that injured the plaintiff.
Under similar facts, the same result was reached in Pavia.'17 Finally, in
action of
Workman, it was sufficient that the defendant took the affirmative
72
simply throwing debris on the floor and failing to pick it up.'
Later opinions relied on Taylor in denying claims averring facts similar
to those averred in cases where "something more" was found. Under Quinn v.
Clayton Construction Co., throwing items off a roof did not constitute an
affirmative negligent act rising to the level of something more.' 73 In Kelley,
the Supreme Court's exoneration of the co-employees rested on the fact they
followed company policy. 174 In Quinn, a case following Taylor, the coemployees disobeyed company policy, but they were still granted immunity.' 75 In Graham v. Geisz, the plaintiff was injured as a result of the coemployee defendant taking the affirmative negligent act of unlocking the
"cans" at a time she was not supposed to. 176 This conduct was no different
and should be no less actionable than the co-employee's affirmative act of
was found sufficient to impose "somethrowing debris on the ground that
177
thing more" liability in Workman.
A more accurate analysis of Taylor is that the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction is not dead so much as it is applied in a slightly different manner

167. Id. at 622.
168. Id. at 622-23.
169. 715 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
170. Hedglin v. Stahl Specialty Co., 903 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995);
see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hedglin.
171. Pavia v. Childs, 951 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); see supra notes 14650 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pavia.
172. Workman v. Vader, 854 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); see supra
notes 151-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Workman.
173. 111 S.W.3d 428, 433-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); see supra notes 75-85 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Quinn.
174. 865 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
175. 111 S.W.3d at428, 431, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
176. 149 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); see supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of Graham.
177. 854 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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than it has traditionally been applied. Courts have seemingly altered the literal
definition of active versus passive negligence. Apparently passive negligence,
i.e., nonfeasance, in the "something more" context includes affirmative actions that create risks an employer would anticipate given the nature of the
work. For example, in Taylor, the co-employee engaged in a risk-creating
action through his careless driving, 178 but an employer should have reasonably anticipated that its trash-truck drivers getting into accidents because of
negligent driving. Although the employee engaged in the negligent act of
careless driving, this type of action was viewed as nonfeasance because the
co-employee was, in effect, simply not carrying out his employer's nondelegable duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace. 79 Therefore, the coemployee in such situations enjoys the immunity provided by the Act. Similarly, since the injured employee's job in Logan involved working with potentially live power lines, electrocution was a normal risk of the job despite
any affirmative acts taken by the injured employee's supervisor."' In Quinn,
a normal risk of working on a construction job site is the possibility of falling
risk of taking cans off rollers is that a can
objects.' 8 1 In Graham, a normal
82
correctly.'
locked
be
may not
Active negligence in the "something more" context, on the other hand,
appears to involve those situations in which negligent co-employees willfully
and wantonly take actions that they should know will increase the risk of
those around them. In these types of situations, the affirmative act, as opposed to risk inherent in the job itself, creates the risk of harm. 83 Groh v.
Kohler provides a good example. The plaintiffs injury was not the type of
injury for which someone in her position was typically at risk."4 Only a minimal risk of her hand being compressed existed if she was not ordered to work
with a knowingly defective machine. 85 However, that risk was drastically
increased when86 her co-employee consciously ordered her to operate a defective machine.'
Such an analysis also explains the pre-Taylor cases in which courts found
"something more." In Craft, the fireworks machine would not normally have
posed a risk of fire but for the co-employee's conduct.' 7 In Hedglin, a normal
risk of the injured employee's job did not entail hanging from a forklift over a

178. 73 S.W.3d 620, 621 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
179. See id. at 622.
180. Logan v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 122 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Mo. Ct. App.
2003); see supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of Logan.
181. 111 S.W.3d 428, 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
182. 149 S.W.3d 459, 462-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
183. See Groh v. Kohler, 148 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
184. Id. at 16.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See 715 S.W.2d 531, 537-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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vat of scalding water.' 88 Likewise, a normal risk of the plaintiff's job in Pavia
did not include a fall from a raised forklift.' 8 9 Finally, in Workman, the normal
risk of a jewelry worker's job did not entail having to walk over cardboard on
the floor.190

IV. CONCLUSION
This analysis of the "something more" doctrine attempts to characterize
the cases dealing with the doctrine in a workable manner. However, no clearcut rule exists in spite of the vast amount of litigation surrounding this issue.
This creates difficulty for attorneys on both sides of the aisle. Plaintiffs attorneys have a hard time determining whether "something more" exists, and therefore, whether to bring such a suit. Similarly, defense attorneys have difficulty
responding to any arguments posed by a plaintiff because it remains unclear
is it appears
exactly what constitutes a sufficient claim. After Taylor, however,
91
plaintiffs will have more difficulty stating a viable claim.'
By limiting the "something more" doctrine, the Missouri Supreme Court
is restricting the plaintiffs options for recovery and giving the real wrongdoer a
free pass. Instead of restricting the availability of the doctrine back any further,
the court should formulate a hard and fast rule that focuses on expectant hazards. By formulating such a rule, the court would protect the interests of plaintiffs while at the same time not overexposing co-employees to liability. Such a
rule is in line with the trend identified in the previous section, and, by expressly
adopting this rule, all parties involved in such actions would have more guidance in determining the validity of claims.
MICHAEL S. KRUSE

188. See 903 S.W.2d 922, 926-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
189. See Craft v. Scamen, 951 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); see supra
notes 135-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Craft.
190. 854 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
191. See generally, Graham v. Geisz, 149 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004);
Logan v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 122 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Kesterson v. Wallut, 116 S.W.3d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Quinn v. Clayton Constr. Co.,
111 S.W.3d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Brown v. Roberson, 111 S.W.3d 422 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2003).
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